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This essay defends causal decision theory (CDT) against some alleged counterexamples that 
proponents of evidential decision theory (EDT) have raised against it.  I argue that sophisticated 
deliberational versions of CDT, pioneered by Skyrms (1982, 1990) and elaborated in Arntzenius 
(2008) and Joyce (2012), can defuse any of these counterexamples. 
The paper has six sections.  §1 distinguishes Newcomb problems from pseudo-Newcomb 
problems.  §2 addresses predictability and freedom.  §3 distinguishes CDT and EDT.  §4 defends 
CDT’s handling of Newcomb problems.  §5 introduces the notion of deliberational equilibrium, 
and distinguishes picking from choosing.  §6 considers “unstable” decisions and defuses 
counterexamples from Spencer and Wells (2018) and Ahmed (2014b). 
 
§1  Newcomb Problems  
In Newcomb problems choices correlate with features of the world that choosers cannot 
causally influence.  As a result, acts that cause desirable/undesirable future results can also 
indicate undesirable/desirable past events, leaving agents to wonder whether to causally 
promote desirable outcomes or to produce news of desirable outcomes they do not control. 
All Newcomb problems can be subsumed under a common rubric.  Imagine an idealized 
agent, let’s say you, who is now (time t1) facing a decision, and a predictor, Omega, who at past 
time t0 made a guess about how you would act on the basis of an examination of your t0 brain-
state (a common cause of both his guess and your choice).  Things are arranged so that the 
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outcome of your choice depends on Omega’s guess, but your only evidence about this comes 
via your knowledge of own current beliefs and desires, which are clues to your t0 brain-state. 
For our purposes, any (ideal) Newcomb problem satisfies the following: 
NP1 For each possible act A there is an associated ‘type-A’ brain state, and you 
are subjectively certain that you will do A at t1 iff you occupied the type-A 
state at t0, hereafter A.2  You typically will not know your type until you 
know what you (irrevocably) choose. 
NP2 Omega tried to discern your type at t0, and guessed that you would choose 
A, hereafter A, iff he identified you as type-A.  Omega may or may not be a 
perfect identifier of types.  But, for all acts A and B, you know Omega’s 
chances of misclassifying you as type-B when you are really type-A. 
NP3 The past is fixed.  You cannot now change your t0 state, Omega’s prediction, 
or any other past fact. 
NP4 Omega is reliable i.e., better than chance at predicting your act.  Moreover, 
absent further evidence, your confidence in Omega’s reliability is constant 
throughout the decision-making process. 
NP5 You are free.  No obstacles prevent you from choosing whichever act you 
ultimately judge best.  Crucially, whatever Omega predicted and however 
reliable he is, you have the power to falsify his prediction.  You might not 
want to exercise this power and might be sure that you will not, but you can. 
I take NP1-NP5, as elaborated below, as definitive of Newcomb problems.  People frequently 
mistake decisions satisfying only some of these conditions for genuine Newcomb problems, and 
wrongly portray solutions to such pseudo-Newcomb problems as answers to the real thing.  
To explain NP1-NP5 it helps to have a formal model of you as a decision maker.3  You face a 
free choice among acts {A1, A2,…, AM} whose outcomes depend on which member of a partition 
{S1, S2,…, SN} of states obtains.  Each act/state pair fixes an outcome Om,n that encompasses all 
relevant consequences of Am when Sn obtains.  States describe features of the world that you 
cannot influence, but which may affect the outcome of your act.  In light of NP3, each Sn will 
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specify both your type and Omega’s guess, i.e., each is a conjunction Aj & Ai &…., the ellipsis 
capturing any further facts that affect outcomes. 
At each time t you are endowed with a subjective utility function utilt that measures the 
desirabilities of outcomes, and a credence function probt that encodes your degrees of belief in 
events that might influence the outcome of your choice.  Since we will not consider changes in 
desire, utilt is assumed constant.  There is some dispute over the proper domain of probt, but all 
agree that probabilities of states conditional on acts are well-defined.  So, you always have a 
definite estimate, probt(Sn/Am), of the probability that Sn will obtain if you do Am.4   
To illustrate, consider first the Flagship Newcomb problem: you choose between act ONE of 
taking an opaque box that contains $1000000 iff Omega predicted that you would take only 
that box, and act TWO of taking the opaque box plus a transparent box containing $1000.  We 
represent your decision thus ($1000 = 1 utile): 
Flagship ONE & ONE ONE & TWO TWO & ONE TWO & TWO  
                  ONE 1000 , p $0 , 1 – p 1000 , 0 0 , 0 
                  TWO 1001, 0 1 , 0 1001, 1 – q 1, q 
      TABLE-1 
Acts are at the left, states across the top. The first entry in each cell is the utility of the outcome 
received there.  The second is your estimate of the probability of the cell’s associated state 
conditional on its act.  Your estimates of the probabilities that Omega correctly guessed your 
choices of ONE or TWO are p = prob(ONE/ONE) and q = prob(TWO/TWO), which both exceed 0.5 
(NP4).  Both are one when Omega is a perfect predictor.   
Gibbard & Harper’s (1978) Death-in-Damascus provides another example.  You are on the 
highway between Damascus and Aleppo, and will suffer a fate worse than death if you fail to 
arrive in one of the cities by nightfall.  Alas, your prospects are little better if you do arrive.  
Yesterday Omega (irrevocably) predicted your destination, and sent assassins to the predicted 
city.  To go there is to die; to go the other way is to live.  With 1 = life and 0 = death, your 
decision is: 
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DD ALEP & ALEP ALEP & DAM  DAM & ALEP DAM & DAM  
     ALEP 0 , p 1 , 1 – p  0 , 0 1, 0 
     DAM 1 , 0 0 , 0 1 , 1 – q  0 , q 
       TABLE-2 
Here you have a mortality rate of p = prob(ALEP/ALEP) or q = prob(DAM/DAM) depending on 
whether you choose Aleppo or Damascus.  Again, we can imagine Omega as perfect, in which 
case your mortality rate is 1 wherever you go. 
We discuss these examples in detail below, but first let’s better understand NP1- NP5. 
 
§2  Reconciling NP1-NP5:  How You Can Be Free While Omega is Reliable? 
Newcomb problems asks us to square three seemingly irreconcilable beliefs.  You, the 
agent, must be convinced that (a) you cannot affect Omega’s prediction, (b) Omega reliably 
predicts your choices, but (c) you are free to falsify his prediction.  But, how can you be sure 
that Omega’s prediction and your choice will coincide unless one affects the other? 
Let’s start by asking how you can know you will choose A at t1 iff you occupied the type-A 
brain state at t0, as NP1 requires.  The answer is that, you count as type-A at t0 when, given your 
actual circumstances at t0 and after, you end up disposed to rank A among your best options at 
t1 and to pick it over similarly ranked options.  Dependence on actual circumstances is crucial.  
As a type-A you will choose A in the actual world, but need not do so in other possible worlds 
(though “type-A” denotes a different brain state there).  A two-box type in Flagship will actually 
choose TWO (probably because it dominates ONE).  But, if something had disturbed its reasoning 
between t0 and t1 it might have chosen ONE.  Thus, there is only a contingent connection 
between being in the type-A state at t0 and choosing A at t1.  Differently put, intrinsic features 
of the type-A state (which “being type-A” is not) could cause different choices at t1 depending 
on what transpires between t0 and t1.  
The upshot is that your act is predictable from intrinsic features of your t0 brain-state only 
insofar as your actual situation is known.  This helps us understand NP2.  Omega may know 
enough about your situation to deduce a definite t1 choice from each intrinsically described t0 
brain state.  Unless he is perfect, however, he will not know which intrinsic t0 state you occupy, 




your t0 brain-state, but you might be unable to identify your type before t1 because you lack 
information about the situation between t0 and t1.  So, you can be certain you will choose A at 
t1 iff you are type-A at t0, and yet not know your type until you (irrevocably) decide what to do. 
NP3 requires you to regard the world’s state as causally independent of your act.  You must 
be confident that, whichever state is actual and whatever act you will in fact choose, the world 
would still have been in that same state had you chosen otherwise.  This requirement of causal 
act/state independence has been elucidated in a variety of ways.  Following Stalnaker (1967), 
Gibbard and Harper (1978) characterize it using subjunctive conditionals.  On this model, you 
regard S as causally independent of A just when your credences for A  S and S are equal.  
Lewis (1981) offers a similar analysis, but uses conditionals with chance consequents.  Both 
models interpret subjunctive conditionals to exclude “backtrackers” like, “even though Omega 
correctly predicted TWO, he would have predicted ONE had I chosen ONE.” Pearl (2000) employs 
a do-operator that conditions on A while holding past facts fixed.5  S is then independent of A 
when probt(S|doA) = probt(S).  Joyce (2010) advocates Bayesian imaging for these purposes.  All 
these approaches are consistent with one another (Joyce, 2010).  For our purposes it does no 
harm to use Gibbard/Harper’s approach, which is a special case of the rest.  This gives us: 
   NP3 (Causal Independence)  For each state S and acts A and B, you are certain that if 
A & S actually holds, then S would still have held had you chosen B, so that 
probt(B  S / A & S) = 1 at all times t. 
This entails that states are counterfactually independent of acts:  probt(A  S) = probt(S). 
NP3 requires you to regard the past as beyond your present influence.  Specifically, you 
must believe that acting differently than you in fact do would not alter either your type or 
Omega’s prediction, so that probt(B  C & D / A & C & D) = 1 for any acts A, B, C, D.  In 
Flagship, you must be convinced that if you take only the opaque box and get the million, then 
you would still have gotten the million had you taken both.  In DD you must believe that if you 
are in fact going to die in Aleppo, then you would have lived had you fled to Damascus.  Let me 
stress that you are not in a Newcomb problem if you lack these sorts of beliefs!  Newcomb 
choosers are not deluded about their ability to change the past!   
Turning now to NP4, we need to know what it means to regard Omega as reliable.  Does it 
mean that he is likely to be correct given what he guessed, or given what you choose?  It is the 
second notion that matters.  For Omega’s reliability to remain unchallenged up through the 
moment of choice, reliability in the first sense would require your act-given-state credences to 
remain constant throughout the decision-making process.  This would prevent you from seeing 
                                                     




yourself as having a free choice about A since your evidence about Omega’s predictive prowess 
would constrain what you could believe about your own actions.  In DD, if prob(A|A) = 0.8 and 
prob(D|D) = 0.9 are fixed, then the laws of probability dictate that 0.1 ≤ prob(A) ≤ 0.8, which 
means you cannot be fully confident either that you will do A or that you won’t.  As Isaac Levi 
(1989, 2000) stresses, you cannot see yourself as controlling your fate when act probabilities 
are restricted this way.  His response is to deny that it makes sense to assign probabilities to 
you own acts during deliberation.  
I have argued against this view (2002, 2007), and will not recap my misgivings here.  The 
key point is that seeing yourself as free is consistent with being confident (even certain) that 
Omega has correctly predicted the act you will actually do, but not with being confident that 
you will do whatever he predicted.  Seeing yourself as free is consistent with confidence (even 
certainty) that Omega has correctly predicted the act you will actually do, but not with 
confidence that you will do whatever he predicted.  In Flagship you assign high credence to both 
these “prediction-if-act” conditionals: 
If I do choose ONE/TWO, then Omega is likely to have predicted ONE/TWO. 
But, you assign low credence to at least one of these “act-given-prediction” conditionals: 
If Omega predicted ONE/TWO, then I am likely to choose ONE/TWO. 
To the extent that you see yourself as free, your credences for these conditionals coincide 
with your credences for their consequents, which rules out being confident in both.  Suppose 
you come to see ONE as your best option.  As a free agent you will not reason like this:  “ONE 
is my best option, but I won’t choose it if Omega predicted TWO, because he is so reliable.”  
Rather, you reason:  “I’ll choose my best option whatever Omega predicted.  So, I’ll choose 
ONE even if he predicted TWO.  But, since ONE is my best option, Omega probably predicted 
ONE.” As a free agent you are confident that you will do what you most prefer, whatever 
Omega predicted, and however reliable you take him to be.  But, you are also confident that 
Omega predicted the act you will most prefer. 
This brings us to NP5, and what it means to be free.  The relevant notion is familiar from 
compatibilist theories of free will.  You see yourself as free when you are confident that (i) 
no constraints prevent you from choosing an act that you judge to be among your best 
options, and (ii) your choice is the immediate effect of your ranking the chosen act among 
your best options.  In Newcomb problems (i) is the idea that your choice is not constrained 
by your past state or by Omega’s prediction.  Even conditional on A & B, the only thing that 
prevents you from choosing any act on the menu is that you do not rank it among your best 




from choosing ONE.  Agents eschew “contrary-to-type” choices not because they cannot 
make them, but because they do not see making them as being in their interests. 
Clause (ii) requires your credences for actions to respond to evidence in a distinctive way.  
You should be confident of performing A only if you rank it among your best options.  To a first 
approximation, other considerations should affect your estimate of A’s probability only insofar 
as they convey information about A’s merits relative to other acts.  I will say more later, but the 
salient point now is that, when freely choosing, your beliefs about acts are driven exclusively by 
your judgments about which of them best satisfy your desires, and your belief that you will 
choose an option that you ultimately regard as best. 
 
§3  Causalism and Evidentialism  
In Newcomb problems acts influence the future and indicate the past.  By performing A you 
bring about outcomes that A causes and create evidence for thinking that you occupied the 
“type-A” state at t0.  Choosing ONE in Flagship secures you whatever is in the opaque box, and 
creates evidence that it is not empty.  Choosing ALEP in DD causes you to be in Aleppo, and 
creates evidence that Omega’s assassins are already there.  Here is the question that divides 
CDT and EDT:  Should you choose acts exclusively on the basis of what they cause or also on the 
basis of what they non-causally indicate?  CDT says that only causal consequences matter; EDT 
considers purely evidential implications as well. 
This disparity emerges in calculations of expected utility.  The theories agree that an act’s 
value is a probability-weighted average of the utilities of its potential outcomes, but CDT 
weights each outcome by the unconditional probability of the state that brings it about, while 
EDT weights it by the probability of that state conditional on the act.  Under appropriate 
conditions (see below), A’s choiceworthiness in CDT is given by its efficacy value U(Am) = n 
prob(Sn)util(Om,n), while A’s choiceworthiness in EDT is its news value V(Am) = n 
prob(Sn/Am)util(Om,n).  Differences in U-values reflect expected disparities in desirabilities of 
future outcomes that acts cause, while differences in V-values reflect expected disparities in 
evidence that acts provide about future or past facts. 
Causation and indication, which usually go together, diverge in Newcomb problems.  
Causalists look at Flagship like this, where x is your credence for being a one-box type, p = 





Flagship ONE & ONE ONE & TWO TWO & ONE TWO & TWO  
                  ONE 1000 , px $0 , (1 – p)x 1000 , 0 0 , 0 
                  TWO 1001 , 0 1 , 0 1001 , (1 – q)(1 – x) 1 , q(1 – x) 
      TABLE-3 
The sum of the second entries in each column is the unconditional probability of that column’s 
state, and causal expected utilities are: 
U(ONE) = 1000px + 0(1 – p)x + 1000(1 – q)(1 – x) + 0q(1 – x) = 1000(px + (1 – q)(1 – x)) 
U(TWO) = 1001px + 1(1 – p)x + 1001(1 – q)(1 – x) + 1q(1 – x) = U(ONE) + 1 
Thus, CDT favors TWO over ONE.  EDT computes expected utilities like this: 
V(ONE) = 1000p + 0(1 – p) + 10000 + 00 = 1000p 
V(TWO) = 10010 + 10 + 1001(1 – q) + 1q = 1001 – 1000q 
This favors ONE over TWO when Omega is sufficiently reliable (p + q > 1001/1000). 
Death in Damascus is more complicated.  Here is CDT’s picture, x being your credence in 
being an Aleppo type: 
DD ALEP & ALEP ALEP & DAM DAM & ALEP DAM & DAM  
                  ALEP 0 , px 1 , (1 – p)x 0 , 0 1 , 0 
                  DAM 1 , 0 0 , 0 1 , (1 – q)(1 – x) 0 , q(1 – x) 
      TABLE-4 
Then, U(ALEP) = (1 – p)x + q(1 – x) = 1 – U(DAM), and U(ALEP)  U(DAM) iff x ≤ (q – ½)/[(p – ½) + (q 
– ½)].  The evidential utilities are V(ALEP) = 1 – p and V(DAM) = 1 – q, and V(ALEP)  V(DAM) iff q  
p.  So, EDT recommends whichever city is associated with the type that Omega has the hardest 
time predicting irrespective of your beliefs about your type. CDT’s recommendation, in contrast, 
depends on how confident you are about your type.  Notice that, in addition to ranking acts 
using different criteria, U’s values are higher than V’s.  This is because U, with its focus on the 
future, factors out the bad news of having to face DD in the first place, while V reflects this. 
CDT and EDT also differ about the values of decisions as wholes. In any decision your time-t 




You can use these credences to attach a utility to your overall predicament, the status quo as 
Skyrms (1990) calls it, by averaging expected utilities of acts, weighting each by its probability.  
In CDT, U(SQ) = m prob(Am)U(Am) = mn prob(Am)prob(Sn)U(Om,n) is your best estimate of the 
improvement/decline in your fortunes that will occur as an effect of making the decision.  In 
EDT, V(SQ) = m prob(Am)V(Am) = m n prob(Sn & Am)U(Om,n) is the news value of making the 
decision.  In DD, U(SQ) = 1 – x + (2x – 1)U(ALEP), while V(SQ) = 1 – (xp + (1 – x)q).  At x = 1/3, p = 
0.9 and q = 0.7 the numbers work out so that U(SQ) = 0.5 and V(SQ) = 0.233.  CDT is thus 
indifferent between facing DD and playing Russian roulette with three bullets in a six-shooter, 
while EDT recommends playing with four bullets.  This difference is to be expected since CDT 
ignores the “bad news” of having to play Russian roulette in the first place. 
Notice too that CDT assesses decisions differently when considering them in prospect than 
when they are actively being made.  You consider a choice among acts A1,…, AM in prospect 
when you will choose among them at some future time, but cannot choose now.6  Viewed in 
prospect, acts in future decisions are treated not as current options, but as potential outcomes 
lying causally downstream of your current choice.  And, as with anything not under your current 
control, CDT assesses future acts using their current news values.  For example, if you can 
decide now whether to face DD tomorrow, then ALEP is not a current option; it is a potential 
consequence whose current value is V(ALEP).  This value is very low:  learning that you will 
choose ALEP is bad news, now and tomorrow.  Of course, CDT says that tomorrow you should 
not worry about bad news that you cannot then control (e.g., being caught in DD), but only 
about how to make things that you can control.  But, it also says that you should consider ALEP’s 
news value when deciding whether to expose yourself to a future decision in which it might be 
chosen.  For example, when deciding whether to face DD, the fact that facing it is a strong 
indicator of your death is highly relevant.  Thus, although CDT values a decision you can now 
make at U(SQ), it values the same decision in prospect at V(SQ).  As a result, CDT and EDT often 
agree about which future decisions to make even if not about how to make them.        
 
§4  Pseudo-Flagship Fallacies 
Opponents of CDT press two broad sorts of objections.  Some, like Levi (2000), claim that 
the theory is ill-founded or incoherent, e.g., because it lets agents have credences for their own 
acts.  Others, like Horgan (1981), Egan (2007), and Ahmed (2014a, b), claim that CDT gives bad 
advice.  Since I have discussed the first worry elsewhere,7 I will focus on the second here.  First, 
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I will consider arguments against CDT’s two-boxing policy in Flagship.  Then, after developing 
CDT more fully in §5, I will address more complicated cases, like DD, in §6.  A unifying theme 
will be that many objections to CDT involve a kind of bait-and-switch in which the answer to a 
pseudo-Newcomb is presented as the solution to a genuine Newcomb problem. 
For example, some proponents of one-boxing see Flagship like this, with zero-probability 
outcomes seen as impossibilities: 
 ONE & ONE ONE & TWO TWO & ONE TWO & TWO  
            ONE 1000 , p 0 , 1 – p   
            TWO   1001 , 1 – q  1 , q 
      Table-5 
This requires you to hold act/state correlations fixed by treating ONE  ONE like a logical truth.8  
This is not Flagship! In Flagship one-box types have the option to two-box, and two-box types 
have the option to one-box.  They do not exercise these options, and are certain they will not, 
simply because they do not see it as in their best interests to do so.  In Table-5, however, 
contrary-to-type choices are not just undesirable; they are impossible.  Since ~ONE & ONE and 
~TWO & TWO are contradictory, you lack the power to falsity Omega’s prediction — had your 
choice been different, his guess would have been different — a violation of NP3 and NP5.  The 
mistake lies in treating outcomes in which you act contrary to type like impossibilities rather 
than events that will not occur because you will not want them to occur.  You are confident of 
ONE  ONE not because you lack the power to falsify it, but because you see it as being in your 
interest to make it true.  If you are a two-box type, you will eventually become convinced of 
~ONE & ~ONE and also of ONE  ~ONE.  So, even though you are certain of ONE  ONE given 
what you actually choose (TWO), you are also certain that it would be false were you to choose 
differently.  Likewise for one-box types. 
For another pseudo-Newcomb, suppose you are going to face Flagship at time t1 with p = 
0.8 and q = 0.9.  But, at t–1 < t0 (before Omega guesses) you can choose your type, and Omega 
will base his guess on what you choose.  There is no reneging:  if you choose to be a one/two-
box type at t–1, you will freely choose ONE/TWO at t1 (because you will want to).  Clearly, you 
should choose ONE.  This will cost a utile at t1, but that’s cheap for an 80% chance at 1000 
utiles.  But, if you choose to be a two-box type at t–1, you get the extra 1 utile, but only a 10% 
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chance of an added 1000.  Here everyone recommends choosing to be a one-box type at t–1: it 
maximizes both U and V. 
Some think it incoherent for CDT to recommend ONE over TWO at t–1, but TWO over ONE at 
t1.  This is sometimes portrayed as an unwillingness of CDT to stand behind its advice.  If TWO is 
right at t1, shouldn’t you strive to be the type who chooses TWO then?  Others see temporal 
inconsistency.   By recommending ONE at t–1 doesn’t CDT implicitly endorse ONE at t1, and then 
reverse itself and endorse TWO at t1. Still others (Yudkowsky 2010) see “reflective incoherence”: 
agents who maximize U at all times will wish at t1 that they had used a decision rule that chose 
ONE at t–1. 
These worries presuppose that by choosing ONE in ONE-vs-TWO you somehow sanction 
ONE in ONE-vs-TWO. This is mistaken.  You make the first choice before Omega’s guess, when you 
can still influence it.  You make the second choice when Omega’s guess is part of the inalterable 
past.  But, CDT’s advice is consistent.  It always says that, at any time t, choose from among the 
options available to you at t an act that you expect to be most efficacious at causing desirable 
results.  CDT only seems inconsistent when we forget that ONE-vs-TWO and ONE-vs-TWO involve 
different options with different causal properties exercised at different times.  In ONE-vs-TWO 
you can influence whether you get the million, and CDT recommends the action, from among 
those available at t–1, that is most likely to bring this about.  That’s ONE.  But, in ONE-vs-TWO 
your type is fixed, and CDT tells you to cause the best results given your t1 options. That’s TWO. 
Even though TWO is what you should do at t1, it is not what you will do if you chose 
rationally at t–1.  If you chose ONE at t–1 then, while you are free to choose TWO at t1, you will 
not, because, as a one-box type, you mistakenly favor ONE.  You might favor ONE because your 
t–1 choice made you an EDTist, or misled you into thinking that you can alter the past, or maybe 
clouded your cerebellum with vapors of black bile. Who cares? The point is that sanctioning 
ONE over TWO is no endorsement of ONE over TWO.  It is no part of your goal at t–1 to choose 
rationally at t1.  Your only goal at t–1 is to choose from among the options available to you then, 
the act that you expect to best promote desirable outcomes.  From CDT’s perspective, your t–1 
options are “ONE-and-irrationally-choose-ONE” and “TWO-and-rationally-choose TWO”.  Since 
the former causes the best outcome, CDT recommends it even at the cost of later irrationality. 
The moral is that at all times CDT endorses the same choice in each decision: ONE over TWO at 
t–1, TWO over ONE at t1. Even though the first choice makes you botch the second, the 1 utile 
penalty for irrationality at t1 is more than offset by the 70% increase in your chance at 1000 
utiles you get by acting rationally at t-1.  Moreover, you will never wish that you had used a 
decision rule other than CDT.  You might wish that you had different options (e.g., ONE-at-t–1-




There are further examples of this sort one might consider, but I hope to have given 
readers some sense of these bait-and-switch imitations of Flagship.  We turn now to more 
complicated cases in which CDT does not recommend a unique choice. 
 
§5  Decision Instability  
Despite its centrality in the literature, Flagship is not a typical Newcomb problem.  Since 
two-boxing dominates one-boxing, CDT’s recommendation does not depend on your credences.  
In problems like DD credences matter.  In particular, information about how likely you are to 
perform various acts can be evidence about both what future outcomes those acts might cause 
and what past facts they non-causally indicate.  While CDT regards the latter as irrelevant, it 
requires you to consider the first sort of data.  This is why I said CDT requires U-maximization 
“under appropriate conditions.”   Properly understood, it has you maximize U only after taking 
into account all readily available evidence about what your acts may cause. 
While I will not reargue it here, Joyce (2012) contends that you have not processed all your 
evidence about what your acts might cause until your credences and expected utilities reach a 
deliberational equilibrium (prob*, U*) in which every act of positive probability has the utility of 
the status quo.  Here I follow a trail blazed by Skyrms (1982) and travelled by Arntzenius (2008) 
by modeling deliberation as an information-gathering process in which you learn the best ways 
to pursue desirable outcomes by comparing the efficacies of acts to that of the status quo.  Acts 
with Ut-values higher/lower than Ut(SQ) are seen as better/worse than average at promoting 
your aims.  In general, you want acts with Ut-values exceeding Ut(SQ) to have their credences 
increased at the expense of acts with Ut-values below Ut(SQ).  Yet, you cannot alter credences 
ad lib.  Like any beliefs, beliefs about your acts should only change in response to evidence.  
But, not just any evidence.  Since you see yourself as free to choose whichever act you deem 
best, in deliberation your credences for acts should respond only to evidence about their 
choiceworthiness.  Other factors may affect act probabilities only by affecting your views about 
choiceworthiness.  The evidential relations work this way during deliberation because (a) you 
see yourself as a free agent who will do what you ultimately prefer, and (b) you treat the fact 
that Ut(A) exceeds Ut(SQ) as (inconclusive) evidence that A will rank among your most preferred 
options when all evidence is in. 
The details of the deliberative process are not critical, but the idea is that, at each time t, 
you acquire information about the efficacies of options by learning a conjunction [Ut(SQ) = u &m 




incorporate all readily available information about what your acts might cause.9  This happens 
when Ut(Am) = Ut(SQ) for all Am with probt(Am) > 0.  If probt and Ut pass this test, then you have 
achieved an equilibrium and all relevant evidence has been processed.  If not, you must update 
using a belief revision rule that seeks the good (Skyrms) by mapping your time-t credences and 
utilities to time-t+1 credences and utilities in such a way that probt+1(A)  probt(A) iff Ut(A)  
Ut(SQ). For this purpose I like Bayesian dynamics, which has probt+1(A) = 
probt(A)[Ut(A)/Ut(SQ)].10  Once act probabilities are updated, all other credences are revised via 
a Jeffrey shift: probt+1() = m probt+1(Am)probt(/Am).  Since this shift satisfies probt+1(S/A) = 
probt(S/A), it disturbs neither your confidence in Omega’s reliability nor your news values.  Note 
also that this process adjusts act credences only in response to evidence about Ut-values.  This 
is critical: in the midst of deliberation a rational agent’s beliefs about acts change only in 
response to evidence about the merits of those acts. 
In all cases we consider a deliberational equilibrium (prob*, U*) will eventually be reached, 
and updating on U*-values has no further effect on your credences.  You are left with a set of 
live acts B = {B1,…, BK} such that prob*(Bk) > 0, k prob*(Bk) = 1, and U*(Bk) = U*(SQ)  U*(Am) 
for any Am.  Any act not among the Bk is moot since you are sure you will not choose it. 
When B contains only one act, this is what CDT mandates.  Any version of Flagship has a 
unique equilibrium in which you are certain you will take two boxes, confident (or certain) that 
Omega guessed this, and expecting to get far less than 1000 whatever you do. 
When multiple acts survive in equilibrium CDT is indifferent among them.  This happens in 
DD.  If p and q both exceed one-half, DD has a unique equilibrium with 0 < prob*(ALEP) = (q – 
½)/[(p – ½) + (q – ½)] < 1 and U*(ALEP) = U*(DAM). In such cases, you must pick.  “Pick” is a term 
of art for a choice process which selects one from a set of equally good acts in a way that is not 
sensitive to differences in utility.  (Think Buridan’s ass!)  Picking is inherently arational.  Picking 
A over B does not imply that you have more reason to choose A than B. 
Your picking method is a fact about your “type” that goes beyond those features of your t0 
mental state that affect which acts you deem choiceworthy at t1.  For simplicity, I assume your 
                                                     
9 Even if there are modest costs to acquiring evidence my conclusions still hold.  Also, if you must choose 
before you have time to process all relevant causal information, then CDT tells you to maximize efficacy 
value relative to your current, imperfect beliefs.  CDT can say this while still insisting that you would 
have make a better decision if you had more time to gather informaiton.  Thanks to Brad Armendt for 
pressing me on this. 
10 Utilities are measured on a positive scale.  Utilities can always be scaled this way for decisions with 




type determines your pick.11  This means that an Aleppo/Damascus-type is someone who picks 
ALEP|DAM in the DD equilibrium.  I want to emphasize that you will not care how you pick.  By 
arriving at equilibrium you ensure that you see every live act as maximally efficacious in light of 
all available evidence about what your acts might cause.  As far as desires are concerned, a pick 
is an irrelevant detail. 
Even so, you will have beliefs about your picking tendencies, and these explain why Omega 
is better than you at predicting your choices: he has better information about how you’ll pick!  
At t0 he learn two sorts of facts about type:  facts that help him deduce the equilibrium that you 
will settle at, and facts about how you will pick once there.  If his evidence about these things is 
better than yours, he will be better at predicting your behavior.  And, his evidence is better.  In 
equilibrium, your confidence that you will pick A is prob*(A).  As stressed above, this is sensitive 
only to evidence about U-values, and in equilibrium you have taken all such data into account.  
prob*(A) is thus your fully informed estimate of the probability that you are the “pick-A” type.  
If you think Omega has better information about your type than you do, then you will expect 
him to better predict your picks. 
§6  Death and Damascus, and Some Variants  
Many of CDT’s detractors allege that it mishandles decisions in which multiple acts survive 
into equilibrium. These are mostly bait-and-switch arguments, albeit of a subtler variety than 
those already encountered. 
Consider first a version of DD where p = prob(ALEP/ALEP) exceeds q = prob(DAM/DAM), say 
p = 0.9 and q = 0.7.  Here the unique equilibrium is prob(ALEP) = 1/3.  So, if CDT is correct, not 
only is it acceptable to pick Aleppo, you should have a one-in-three probability that you will.  
Doesn’t that seem wrong, given that 10% of those who go to Aleppo survive, while 30% of 
those who go to Damascus survive?  Shouldn’t you choose a higher survival rate (as EDT says), 
and be certain you will? 
Definitely!  But, that’s not your choice.  This is the “choose your type” fallacy in new garb.  
Your survival rate in DD causally depends on your choice and your type.  If you are an Aleppo-
type, you choose between Aleppo-and-dying-with-probability-0.9 and Damascus-and-dying-
with-probability-0.1 (not 0.7).  If you are a Damascus-type, you choose between Damascus-and-
dying-with-probability-0.7 and Aleppo-and-dying-with-probability-0.3 (not 0.9).  Unfortunately, 
being unsure of your type, you cannot know which decision you face.  Having arrived at the 
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then your expectation of that chance, so prob*(A) = M prob*(M) M(A) dM where M ranges over picking 




prob*(ALEP) = 1/3 equilibrium you have acquired as much data as you can, but the decision’s 
diabolical structure — with one city offering better survival rates as the other grows more likely 
— makes it impossible to know which decision you face until after you pick.  Before you pick 
your credence is 1/3 that you face {Aleppo & 0.9 death, Damascus & 0.1 death} and 2/3 that 
you face {Aleppo & 0.3 death, Damascus & 0.7 death}. Picking resolves the uncertainty. To their 
dismay, Aleppo-types learn that they have chosen a 90% chance of death in Aleppo, when they 
could have had a 90% chance of life in Damascus.  Damascus-types are slightly less distressed to 
learn that they opted for a 70% chance of death in Damascus over a 70% chance of life in 
Aleppo.  But nobody chooses from {Aleppo & 90% death, Damascus & 70% death}.  To do that 
they would have to choose their type, which NP3 prohibits. 
Going to Damascus is optimal if you can choose your type before Omega guesses.  You will 
then be choosing between these options: 
 ALEP now and choose from {Aleppo & 90% death, Damascus & 10% death} later on 
when you see Aleppo as the better option. 
 DAM now and choose from {Aleppo & 30% death, Damascus & 70% death} later on 
when you see Damascus as the better option. 
The second option is best.  While choosing it will cause your future self to choose the worse 
future option, it secures you an extra 20% survival probability.  This is an exact analogue of the 
“choosing to be a one-box type” decision.  As before, it does nothing to undermine CDT. 
The idea that you choose your survival rate in DD is hard to shake, as a recent paper by Jack 
Spencer and Ian Wells (2018) illustrates.  Spencer and Wells offer a counterexample, The Semi-
Frustrater, which allegedly undermines CDT’s dominance principle.  Retelling their story as a 
version of DD, suppose you (irrevocably) choose Aleppo or Damascus by pointing toward the 
chosen city with your right or left hand.  The twist is that Omega is better at predicting righties 
than lefties, but righties get cake (0.05 utiles)!  Your situation looks like this, where w, x, y and z 
= 1 – (w + x + y) is your credence for the act in its associated row, and pR > pL and qR > qL: 
SF ALEP & ALEP ALEP & DAM DAM & ALEP DAM & DAM  
     ALEPR 0.05 , wpR 1.05 , w(1 – pR) 0.05 , 0 1.05 , 0 
      ALEPL 0 , xpL 1 , x(1 – pL) 0 , 0 1 , 0 
    DAMR 1.05 , 0 0.05 , 0 1.05 , y(1 – qR) 0.05 , yqR 
      DAML 1 , 0 0, 0 1 , z(1 – qL) 0 , zqL 




For any initial beliefs that give both righty acts positive credence, SF has the same equilibrium 
as DD, so that prob*(ALEPR) = (½ – qR)/[(½ – pR) + (½ – qR)] = 1 – prob*(DAMR).  Lefty acts are thus 
inconsequential.  Their initial probabilities are moot, and it does not matter how reliably Omega 
predicts them. Under any conditions, their equilibrium probabilities vanish because some 
“cake” option always has higher equilibrium expected utility. 
Spencer and Wells see this as wrong.  They claim that rationality requires you to use your 
left hand, and permits choosing either city that way.12  “Consistent right-handers,” they write, 
end up poorer than consistent left-handers because they choose irrationally.” (p. xx)  This 
remark occurs as part of a discussion of the Why Ain’cha Rich (WAR) argument in which 
Spencer and Wells argue that, while WAR fails to justify one-boxing in Flagship, it does justify 
left-handing in SF.  Echoing a well-known line, they correctly argue that the much ballyhooed 
fact that one-boxers end up richer than two-boxers cuts no ice against CDT because, through no 
merit of their own, one-box types start out with better options.  They cannot help being rich no 
matter how poorly they choose, while two-box types cannot help being poor no matter how 
well they choose.  Once we factor in this disparity in initial endowments we see that it is one-
boxers who act irrationally.  Endowed with terrific options ($1000000-vs-$1001000), they 
choose the worst, whereas two-box types respond to their paltry options ($0-vs-$1000) by 
choosing the best.  Moral: people who choose irrationally from desirable options can end up 
better off than people who choose rationally from undesirable options.  However, this does not 
apply in SF, Wells and Spencer argue, because “like consistent left-handers, consistent right-
handers always make their choices [in circumstances that involve] exactly [1.05 utiles].”  The 
point seems to be that righties have better options in SF: righties cannot do worse than 0.05 
utiles, while lefties can end up with 0; righties can secure as much as 1.05, while lefties max out 
at 1.  So, it should count against righties that they end up worse off than lefties. 
This reasoning is flawed.  Spencer and Wells misidentify the advantages of righty versus 
lefty decisions, and their claim about “consistent” right- and left-handers is only plausible for 
choices among types.  For definiteness, suppose Omega correctly predicts lefty choices at a rate 
0.2 lower than righty choices, and that he is correct about righties who go to Aleppo/Damascus 
at a rate of pR = 0.9/qR = 0.7.  Making these assumptions in a real Newcomb problem means 
agreeing that lefty-types are 0.2 less likely to die than righty-types whether they point with their 
left or their right, a huge initial advantage for lefty-types!  They enjoy a 0.2 higher survival rate 
even if they take cake, and righty-types face a 0.2 lower survival rate even if they refuse it.  
Explicitly, a lefty-type faces one of these decisions, though they know not which (being unsure 
of their type): 
                                                     





ALEP & LEFT  DAM & LEFT 
ALEPR   cake, 0.7 death.  ALEPR  cake, 0.5 death. 
ALEPL  no cake, 0.7 death.  ALEPL  no cake, 0.5 death. 
DAMR   cake, 0.3 death.  DAMR  cake, 0.5 death. 
DAML  no cake, 0.3 death.  DAML  no cake, 0.5 death. 
 
A righty-type faces one of these decisions:  
ALEP & RIGHT  DAM & RIGHT 
ALEPR   cake, 0.9 death.  ALEPR  cake, 0.3 death. 
ALEPL  no cake, 0.9 death.  ALEPL  no cake, 0.3 death. 
DAMR   cake, 0.1 death.  DAMR  cake, 0.7 death. 
DAML  no cake, 0.1 death.  DAML  no cake, 0.7 death. 
 
Clearly, it would be better to face one of the top two choices than one of the bottom two, but 
that bird will have flown by the time you choose.  Whatever decision you face, you should take 
cake since doing so has no effect on your survival probabilities.  It only affects what you know 
about them. 
We can, of course, imagine pseudo-Newcombs wherein you should refuse cake because 
hand-choice causally affects survival, perhaps because you choose your hand-type before 
Omega guesses.  Here it is relevant (and decisive) that “consistent” right-handers (righty-types) 
end up poorer than “consistent” left-handers.  But, in SF you choose an act, not a type, only 
after Omega guesses.  Once he has guessed all advantages of being a lefty-type evaporate: 
pointing with your left has no differential effect except to cost you cake. 
Varying this theme, it is easy to confuse the claim that you should choose a lefty act in DD 
with the claim that you should choose a lefty decision.  Suppose you choose in stages.  Initially, 
you (irrevocably) choose a hand to point with, and then you choose between {ALEPR, DAMR} or 
{ALEPL, DAML} depending on the hand selected.  At the initial stage you should clearly choose the 
LEFTY decision.  Though this means forgoing cake, it more than compensates by offering a 0.2 
better survival probability.  It does not follow, however, that you should choose ALEPL or DAML in 
SF, where righty-acts are options.  In the context of a choice between the RIGHTY versus LEFTY 
decisions, SF’s acts are not options, but potential consequences, or acts-in-prospect as in §3.  




the LEFTY decision, CDT tells you to (i) figure out how likely you are to choose ALEPL and DAML 
later if you choose LEFTY now, and (ii) use these probabilities to determine an expected news 
value for the decision.  Similarly for RIGHTY.  This yields  
U(LEFTY) = prob(ALEPL)V(ALEPL) + prob(DAML)V(DAML) 
U(RIGHTY) = prob(ALEPR)V(ALEPR) + prob(DAMR)V(DAMR).    
To find the relevant probabilities you use equilibrium values for future decisions.  With the 
reliability rates we’ve been using, U(LEFTY) = 0.5 > U(RIGHTY) = 0.233.13  So, unless cake is better 
than a 0.267 increase in your mortality rate, you should choose to make the LEFTY decision.  
Starting with different p and q values will yield different utilities, but even for small differences 
in Omega’s predictive abilities the cake must be terrific to make the RIGHTY decision a rational 
choice.  But, to reemphasize the key point, this does not imply that you should point with your 
left in SF.  In SF all four acts — ALEPR, DAMR, ALEPL, DAML — are options and you are assessing 
them on the basis of their propensity to cause desirable consequences.  As long as both righty 
acts are available, one will always win this competition.  Pointing with your left arm when you 
can use your right is forgoing cake needlessly. 
In addition to trying to justify choosing with the left Spencer and Wells argue that you 
cannot rationally choose on the basis of U-values unless there is some act A such that “(i) you 
are in a position to know of A that it maximizes [U], and (ii) conditional on A, [you] are still in a 
position to know of A that it maximizes [U].” (p. 18)  If this is correct, then U-utilities are entirely 
irrelevant to decisions, like DD or SF, where being confident that you will choose any act entails 
being confident that some other act maximizes U.  According to Spencer and Wells, CDT offers 
no guidance value in such cases of “decision instability.” 
This has affinities with the ratificationist idea that choiceworthy acts maximize expected 
utility conditional on the hypothesis that they will be chosen.14  Spencer and Wells’ account is 
an improvement over ratificationism — e.g., it does not imply that an act can be choiceworthy 
merely in virtue being the sole ratifiable alternative —but both views suffer from a common 
flaw.  Both privilege assessments of acts made from the epistemic perspective that the actor 
will have after she chooses them.  In DD you are meant to ask whether ALEP or DAM maximizes 
expected utility when expectations are computed using prob(/ALEP) or prob(/DAM).  Since 
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14 Ratifiability as a criterion for choiceworthiness has been endorsed by evidentialists, like Jeffrey (1983), 
and causalists, like Harper (1986) and Weirich (1985).  Evidentialists and causalists have even joined 




the answer to both questions is “no” you are meant to conclude either that both ALEP and DAM 
are unchoiceworthy, or that CDT provides no help in choosing between them. 
This misses a core insight of Skyrms’ deliberational approach.  It is a mistake to assess acts 
like ALEP and DAM conditional their being chosen because that means assessing them from an 
perspective that omits relevant information about what they might cause.  Reflect on the fact 
that one of prob(/ALEP) or prob(/DAM) is sure to generate a bogus ranking of acts.  Suppose 
you actually are an Aleppo type.  Then, conditioning on ALEP will correctly lead you to rank DAM 
above ALEP, but conditioning on DAM will incorrectly lead you to rank ALEP above DAM.  So, if 
you are an Aleppo-type who follows the ratificationists or Spencer and Wells, then you end up 
relying on false information when you rule out DAM, or when you treat its U-value as irrelevant.  
This prevents you from making your objectively best choice. 
 Of course, you will not know which conditional credal state accurately ranks your options 
until you know how you’ll choose (and thereby learn your type).  What to do?  Easy!  This is a 
standard exercise in Bayesian inference.  If you know you are going to learn the true member of 
a partition {E1,…, EN}, and want to estimate a quantity f whose value depends on En, then you 
should: (a) gather all the free evidence you can about the En, (b) use this data to calculate a 
posterior estimate Exp(f/En) for each n, and (c) set your estimate of f equal to your current 
expectation of your posterior estimate.  Applying this method to DD, you should deliberate 
your way to an equilibrium (prob*, U*); compute U*(ALEP/ALEP) and U*(DAM/DAM); and set 
your estimates to 
U*(ALEP) = prob*(ALEP)U*(ALEP/ALEP) + prob*(DAM)U*(ALEP/DAM) 
U*(DAM) = prob*(ALEP)U*(DAM/ALEP) + prob*(DAM)U*(DAM/DAM) 
You end up exactly where CDT recommends,15 with your equilibrium credences at prob*(ALEP) = 
(½ – q)/[(½ – p) + (½ – q)], and both acts have U*-value one-half. 
Contra Spencer and Wells, CDT does offer useful guidance here.  It says that, in light of all 
the evidence you have when you choose, neither act in DD can be reasonably expected to be 
strictly more effective than the other at promoting your aims, so pick!  It is true that you cannot 
rationally choose ALEP or DAM without picking, for that would require you to both believe that 
you will do the act and simultaneously see it as a U-maximizing option.  Spencer and Wells go 
wrong in thinking that this makes U irrelevant.  Having reached the equilibrium for DD (or SF), 
the reason you can pick between ALEP or DAM is that is their U*-values are the same, and the 
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fact that you are picking means that you are not obliged to see your act as optimal conditional 
on being picked.  You must see it as optimal in light of the information you have when you pick, 
but in decisions like DD and SF this is perfectly consistent with knowing that it will not seem 
optimal after you pick.  This makes such decisions bad ones to face, but does make it a bad idea 
to pick acts that maximize causal expected utility when facing them. 
Finally, let’s consider a more menacing counterexample, due to Ahmed (2014).16  Imagine 
DD with a perfect predictor and the added option, COIN, of letting your destination be settled by 
a fair coin (Aleppo iff heads).  Omega can predict whether you toss the coin but not how it 
lands.  If he predicted a toss, he rolled a die and sent assassins to Aleppo/Damascus if it landed 
even/odd.  Wherever the assassins are, and whatever sent them there, your chance of avoiding 
death by tossing is 0.5.  So, your decision looks like this: 
DDC ALEP ALEP DAM DAM COIN COIN Head COIN COIN Tail 
      ALEP 0 , 1  1 , 0 0 , 0 1, 0 
     DAM 1, 0 0 , 1 1 , 0 0 , 0 
     COIN 0.5, 0 0.5 , 0 0.5 , ½ 0.5 , ½  
Table-7 
All equilibria satisfy 0 ≤ prob*(ALEP) = prob*(DAM) ≤ 0.5, and U*(ALEP) = U*(DAM) = U*(COIN) = 
0.5.  So, CDT requires indifference between all acts, which means that you should refuse to pay 
a cent to toss the coin.  In contrast, EDT has you pay any price up to 0.5 since V(A) = V(D) = 0 < 
V(COIN–) = 0.5 – , where COIN– is the option of paying  utiles to toss the coin. 
Ahmed calls this advice “absurd” and sees it is a reason to abandon CDT.  (2014, p. 592). 
Many will agree.  But, CDT has it right: you should not pay a cent to toss the coin because you 
should not see yourself as buying anything with your money.  Proponents of EDT, of course, 
argue that you are buying an increased probability of life.  Since Omega is 100% reliable, they 
argue, you are certain to die in Aleppo/Damascus if you choose Aleppo/Damascus.  But, if you 
toss the coin then, wherever Omega’s henchmen are, you have a 0.5 objective chance of living.  
It boils down to a certainty of death versus a 50% chance at life (for a pittance).  Pay! 
To see the flaw in this reasoning, note that in any equilibrium prob*(ALEP) = prob*(DAM) = x 
> 0 you do not believe that ALEP and DAM offer certain death.  You estimate that picking ALEP 
gives you probability x of death (ALEP), probability x of life (DAM), and probability 1 – 2x of a 
                                                     




fifty-fifty objective chance at life (COIN).  Thus, your credences for the causal hypotheses HA = 
“Choosing ALEP will cause my death” and HD = “Choosing DAM will cause my death” are both 0.5, 
not 1.0!  What trips people up is that, in virtue of Omega’s reliability, you are justifiably certain 
that: 
H   If I choose ALEP or DAM, then choosing the act I choose will cause my death. 
H seems equivalent to the conjunction HA & HB, and seems to entail that choosing ALEP or DAM 
will cause sure death.  This is wrong.  The phrase “the act I choose” rigidly denotes what you 
actually choose.  H says nothing about the act not chosen (so H ≢ HA & HB).  In fact, choosing 
the other act will cause your survival, which would make it a better choice than COIN– if you 
knew what it was.  Unfortunately, unlike Omega, you will not know what “the act I choose” and 
“the other act” denote until after you pick.  When you pick, you are constrained by your current 
evidence, on which you assign probabilities of x, x and 1 – 2x to the hypotheses that choosing 
ALEP/DAM will cause your objective chance of death to be 100%, 0% or 50%, respectively.  So, 
your credence of living conditional on any of these acts is 0.5.  In terms of your subjective 
estimates of survival probabilities, all three acts offer the same thing.  So, paying to toss the 
coin would be paying for what you already take yourself to have. 
The idea that you get something for your money has at least two possible sources.  It may 
express an irrational form or ambiguity aversion, or it may be a conflation between DDC and 
two subtly different pseudo-Newcombs in which COIN– is optimal.  First, consider ambiguity 
aversion, our well-documented preference for credences based on known objective chances.  
People might prefer COIN because it ensures a 0.5 objective chance of survival, while ALEP/DAM’s 
0.5 survival probability reflects uncertainty about the chances:  in equilibrium, DDC is like 
drawing from an urn with balls marked “100% death,” “0% death,” “50% death” in proportions 
of x, x, 1 – 2x.  Choosing COIN replaces ambiguity with clarity.  Though I will not argue it here, I 
see ambiguity aversion as irrational.17  But, even if I am wrong, it explains COIN’s appeal in a way 
that is consistent with CDT.  The ambiguity averse agent chooses COIN not to improve expected 
survival probabilities, but to relieve herself of the anxiety of not knowing objective risks.  
Paying to toss the coin also seems right because it is so easy to confuse DDC with pseudo-
Newcombs where it is right.  We will consider two examples.  First, suppose you are slated to 
face DD with a perfect predictor later, but can now avoid that choice by paying  and going to 
Aleppo/Damascus iff a fair coin lands heads/tails.  Omega has predicted whether you will take 
this deal.  If he guessed that you would accept he rolled a fair die and sent assassins to 
Aleppo/Damascus iff even/odd.  Otherwise, he executed his usual DD protocol.  CDT might 
                                                     




seem to advise against paying because each act in DD has an equilibrium utility of 0.5, while 
U*(COIN–) = 0.5 – .  Not so – CDT has you pay up to a half utile to toss to cause the desirable 
result of avoiding the ALEP/DAM choice!  Instead of choosing from { ALEP, DAM , COIN}, you get to  
decide between F = [DD later, keep ] and ~F = [avoid DD, pay , 50% risk of death].  Since 
facing-DD-and-choosing-ALEP or facing-DD-and-choosing-DAM are causally downstream of your 
current choice, CDT treats them as acts-in-prospect to be assessed by news value.  Of course, it 
is terrible news that you are slated to go up against a perfectly reliable Omega in DD — a sure 
harbinger of death — and CDT recognizes this by setting U*(F) = prob*(A)V(A) + prob*(D)V(D) 
= V(F) = 0, and U*(~F) = V(~F) = 0.5 – .  So, like EDT, CDT says you should pay up to a half utile 
to avoid DD. 
F-vs-~F is easily conflated with DDC.  Even Ahmed seems to run them together.  When he 
supposes that you face DD against a perfect predictor, he writes 
Everyone agrees that yours is an unfortunate situation. You are playing high-
stakes hide-and-seek against someone who can predict where you will hide… 
There is every reason to think you will lose. (2014, p. 588) 
He then imagines a “third option,” COIN–, and shows that in a choice from {ALEP, DAM, COIN–} 
CDT rejects COIN– for any  > 0.  This is entirely correct, but Ahmed shifts focus when arguing 
that this advice is absurd: 
Would you rather be playing hide-and-seek against (a) an uncannily good predictor 
of your movements or (b) someone who can only randomly guess at them?  [You 
are being] offering the chance to reduce [Omega] from (a) to (b).  Of course you 
should take the offer. (2014, p. 589) 
I agree!  If you can choose to make a pseudo-Newcomb decision with Omega is no better 
than chance rather than a Newcomb decision where he is perfectly reliable, you should do it!  
This is why you take ~F over F.  By choosing ~F you take ALEP and DAM off the table, thereby 
forcing Omega to “play on neutral turf” where his predictive powers can do you no harm.  With 
ALEP and DAM on the table, he has a significant probability (2x) of guessing your choice.  But, he 
can be no better than chance if you tie your destination to the coin toss.  CDT says to take that 
deal!  But, that deal is not DDC.  In DDC, ALEP and DAM remain live options right up to the time 
you irrevocably pick, which forces you to ask how likely it is that choosing them will cause your 
death.  The answer is 0.5, the same as your credence that choosing COIN will cause your death.  
So, you should pay for COIN when that takes ALEP and DAM off the table, but when both remain 
live options paying to toss is paying for what you already have.  Thus, CDT gets both DDC and 




The distinction between DDC and similar decisions in which CDT endorses paying turns on a 
subtle difference in options.  DDC has three — ALEP, DAM and COIN– — and you can only refrain 
from choosing COIN– by choosing one of ALEP or DAM.  There is no fourth alternative of deciding 
not to toss the coin without committing (by choice or pick) to ALEP or DAM, i.e., no disjunctive 
“ALEP or DAM” option.  As a result, you cannot rationally choose COIN– unless your estimate of 
the survival probability caused by tossing the coin exceeds your estimates of the highest of the 
survival probabilities caused by Alep and Dam, which never happens.  In contrast, if you have an 
option like ~F that lets you decline to toss without picking a city, then you assess COIN– relative 
to the menu {COIN–, ~COIN–}, rather than {COIN–, ALEP, DAM}.  Here, ~COIN– is the option of 
first declining COIN– and only later deciding between ALEP and DAM.  In any decision with this 
bipartite structure CDT will treat ~COIN– & ALEP and ~COIN– & DAM as acts-in-prospect, and will 
endorse COIN– over ~COIN–. 
Some people may assume that ~COIN– is always an option.  They might even think that a 
rational agent can always ensure its availability by making a kind of pre-decision in which the 
options are choosing later from the {COIN–, ~COIN–} menu or the {COIN–, ALEP, DAM} menu.  I 
doubt this, but even if it were true it would pose no problems for CDT.  If ~COIN–  is always an 
option, then Ahmed’s counterexample will never arise and CDT will always rightly recommend 
paying to toss the coin.  If agents can pre-decide between {COIN–, ~COIN–} and {COIN–, ALEP, 
DAM}, then we have another pseudo-Newcomb.  CDT will treat all entries in these menus as 
acts-in-prospect, and will recommend selecting the first menu, and subsequently choosing 
COIN– from it.  Either way, Ahmed’s example does not undermine CDT.  In any version of the 
problem in which ~COIN– is an option CDT recommends paying to toss the coin.  In DDC, where 
ALEP and DAM  are options but COIN– is not, CDT rightly recommends not paying because paying 
buys nothing. 
One might consider other examples, but readers should have the flavor of CDT’s responses.  
If we focus on real Newcomb problems, which satisfy NP1-NP5, the sophisticated version of CDT 
that requires choices to be made in equilibrium gets every case right.  When it seems to falter, 
either the theory is being misapplied, options are being misidentified, or a solution to a pseudo-
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